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Article 6

SPEECH

REDISCOVERING THE COMMON LAW
Hon. DiarmuidF O'Scannlain*
Thankyou for inviting me to join you today. I always enjoy speaking to law students, and it is a particular honor and a great pleasure to
be here at Notre Dame, a school I hold in the highest esteem.
I want to begin my talk today with a simple definition familiar to
anyone with a modicum of legal training: that the common law is
judge-made law. Although a useful shorthand definition, it is also
laden with particular assumptions about the practice of judging-assumptions whose often pernicious effect on law I wish to examine
more closely.
The idea of the judge as lawmaker is a fundamental theme of
legal education. We are trained to appreciate and to emulate the
skills of the common lawyer-deftly distinguishing cases and drawing
telling analogies between them; forcefully mastering and shaping long
and intricate lines of legal doctrine; wisely correcting the failures and
excesses of legislators. In his pithy but profound book, An Introduction
to Legal Reasoning, the late Edward H. Levi rightly observed that "[t] he
basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example. It is reasoning from case to case."' Our common law heritage thus inheres in our
characteristic method of reasoning.
With typical acuity, Justice Antonin Scalia has pointed out that
common law reasoning is a thrilling way to train law students, "because it consists of playing common-law judge, which in turn consists
of playing king-devising, out of the brilliance of one's own mind,
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. These remarks were delivered to the Notre Dame Law School Chapter of the
Federalist Society for Law and Policy Studies on October 16, 2003, in Notre Dame,
Indiana. The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily reflect the
views of my colleagues or of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
I would like to acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance of Andrew McStay, my law
clerk, in preparing these remarks.
1 EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1949).
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those laws that ought to govern mankind."2 Justice Scalia and other
commentators note that the origins of this view can be found in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's opus, The Common Law, which enshrined
a judge-centered view of legal development. Indeed, Holmes can
fairly be said to be the source of the simple equation of common law
with judge-made law. For Holmes, law could be boiled down to judicial preconceptions, as expressed in his famous formulation, "The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more
to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
3

should be governed."

The Holmesian concept of the common law has had far-reaching
consequences. The jurisprudential theory of legal realism, for example, which sees law as merely the expression ofjudges' politics, can be
traced to Holmes's emphasis on judges as the primary agents of legal
change. And the idea of the judge as lawmaker forms a crucial component of the approach to constitutional adjudication known as "living Constitutionalism."
I have spoken elsewhere of my firm opposition to the notion of a
"living Constitution."4 I reject the idea that the Constitution evolves
to reflect contemporary political and moral understandings. Rather,
the Framers adopted a written constitution to prevent change: to fix
the meaning of certain rights and to put them beyond the capacity of
overreaching majorities or an aggrandizing State to take them away.
By allocating powers between the state and federal governments and
further dividing authority in separate branches, the Constitution enshrines the principle of limited government-a Leviathan chained.
And it goes almost without saying that the Framers' plan has served us
well.
Of necessity, however, the theory of a living Constitution requires
judges willing to act as lawmakers. Who better to adapt the Constitution to the exigencies of the moment than those versed in the techniques of common law adjudication and imbued with the Holmesian
view of law as the product of judicial creation?
2
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4 See Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Today's Senate Confirmation Battles and the
Role of the Federal Judiciary, Commencement Address to the Class of 2003, Northwestern College of Law of Lewis & Clark College, Portland, Or. (May 24, 2003).
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Yet I do not wish to imply that our common law heritage holds no
value for us today. Indeed, against the familiar idea of the judge as
lawmaker, I would like to propose a return to an older, truer spirit of
common law adjudication. Steeped in English legal culture, the Framers understood the common law as a repository of both liberty and
tradition. Justly proud of their common law heritage, they formed
their nascent constitutional and statutory law-both federal and
state-against a backdrop of common law principles. And in great
contrast to our contemporary understanding of the common law, the
Framers viewed common law adjudication not as a license for judicial
invention, but as an activity conducted above all with a spirit of restraint, in which judges were bound by past precedents and the dictates of reason, natural law, and tradition.
In a fine new book entitled Common-Law Liberty: Rethinking American Constitutionalism, Professor James Stoner, recently a James
Madison Fellow at Princeton University and currently at Louisiana
State University, reminds us of the importance and potential vitality of
this "original understanding of common law." 5 The Framers thought

deeply about their common law heritage and its relation to the new
governmental structures they were enacting. In breaking with England, they had no desire to jettison the common law-indeed, they
often couched their argument for independence in terms of the preservation of the common law rights and privileges of English citizens.
The founding generation also took care to ensure by statute or constitution that the common law remained part of the law of each new
independent state. A Virginia law of 1776 provides a typical example:
"[The] common law of England, [and] all statutes or acts of Parliament made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of the
6
reign of King James the first ... shall be considered as in full force."
Such reception statutes nearly always made reference to local adaptations of the common law and clearly reflected a desire to maintain the
inheritance of the common law as it had evolved in accord with the
specific customs, traditions, and conditions of each colony.
But what, exactly, did the common law mean to the Founding
generation? A good place to begin is with the prestige accorded to
Blackstone's Commentaries by the Founders. Sir William Blackstone's
1765 four-volume survey of English law was first published in an Amer5

JAMES

TIONALISM

R.

STONER, JR., COMMON-LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN CONSTITU-

10-16 (2003).

6 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 110 (2d ed. 1985) (citing
9 VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE 127 (William Walter Henning rep., Richmond, J. & G.
Cochran 1821)).
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ican edition in 1771-1772, and it immediately became the most important legal text in early American law. 7 At a time when printed
caselaw was scarce, the Commentaries were a mainstay of personal law
libraries and the foundation of legal education. Even as the colonists
threw off the monarchy whose legal authority Blackstone explored,
they continued to study and to revere their common law heritage.
For Blackstone, the common law was the product of what he
called "immemorial usage . ..

[of which] judicial decisions are the

principal and most authoritative evidence. ' 8 Comprised of established customs, rules, and maxims, the common law provided rules of
decision in disputes over real property, contracts, and torts. It governed the inheritance of lands, and provided rules for construing
wills, deeds, and statutes-establishing, for example (and rather conveniently), that acts of parliament should generally be interpreted so
as not to conflict with common law principles. And, of course, the
common law was the source of essential rights and privileges in criminal proceedings, guaranteeing trial by jury and the privilege against
self-incrimination. A maxim like "no man shall be bound to accuse
himself," although succinct, expressed a hallowed tradition of personal liberty.
Yet Blackstone provided for early Americans more than just a
compilation of common law maxims. The Commentaries also laid out
the method of common law adjudication-the way careful judges
were supposed to apply the common law in particular cases. It is here
we can perhaps best perceive the vast difference between our contemporary understanding of the common law and the view that held sway
at the time of the Founding.
For Blackstone, judges were "the depositaries of the laws[,] the
living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt, and who are
bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the land." 9 Deeply
knowledgeable in the law, judges were the guardians of the common
law because they were "long personally accustomed to the judicial decisions of their predecessors."'10 Yet such a flattering evocation of the
judicial mind did not add up to view of judges as creative agents of
legal change. To the contrary: the Commentaries put forth a conception of judging that is profoundly restrained. Bound by past precedents, a common law judge was not free to give rein to his own
preferences. Instead, the judge's task was, in Blackstone's vivid phrase

8

Id. at 102.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
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over two centuries ago, "to keep the scale of justice even and steady,
and not liable to waiver with every new judge's opinion."1
At the core of this conception of the common law is the idea that
law is something standing apart from the decisions of judges. Although evidence of the state of the law, decisions did not themselves
constitute the common law. Instead, they revealed immutable legal
principles. Judges did not make law, but declared it. Thus, as the
Commentaries noted, even on those rare occasions when judges overturned precedents as contrary to reason or natural law, "the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the
old one from misrepresentation."1 2 The former precedent was merely
an erroneous determination; the newly established rule correctly
stated the underlying law.
This view of the common law is known as the declaratory theory
of adjudication, and it is often portrayed as hopelessly naive in our
post-positivist age. In the eyes of legal realists, the declaratory theory
fails to take into account the dominant role ofjudicial preferences in
shaping the law. I have no desire to recapitulate the long-running
debate between proponents of natural law and advocates of legal positivism. But for our purposes here today, I do wish to observe that the
Framers' conception of the judicial power cannot be separated from
the declaratory theory. As Hamilton noted in The Federalist No. 78,
"The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be
disposed to exercise wILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence
would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body."' 3 In emphasizing the limited role of judges under the
new Constitution, Hamilton and the other Framers assumed that
judges merely interpreted existing law rather than made new law.
The result was the rightful subordination of the judiciary to the
legitimate lawmakers in our system-the legislative branch. Just as the
common law itself acknowledged that its unwritten principles could
be trumped by acts of Parliament, the Constitution firmly lodges the
legislative power in Congress. Lawmaking is reserved for legislators,
and the proper province of the judiciary is the interpretation of duly
enacted laws. And in confining the judicial power to specific cases
and controversies-the only appropriate arena for judicial activity
under the common law-Article III implies that courts will proceed to
interpret the Constitution and statutes under it by employing the
11
id.
12 1 id. at *70.
13 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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methods of common law adjudication. Although common law language is of course scattered throughout the Constitution and common law rights and privileges are enshrined in the Bill of Rights, this
embedding of the common law in the very structure of the Constitution is sometimes overlooked. The very nature of the judicial power,
and its necessary separation from the legislative power, is a reflection
of a common law way of thinking.
Why else would Hamilton conclude that "[t]o avoid an arbitrary
discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound
down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point
out their duty in every particular case that comes before them." 14 The
Framers quite naturally thought of judges as common law judges-as
expositors and not inventors of legal principles. And constitutional
and statutory interpretation would therefore occur in particular cases.
We need not go so far as some scholars, who have suggested that
nearly all constitutional law is itself a species of common law-frequently unmoored, I might add, from any connection to the text of
the Constitution. 15 But it does seem clear that the Framers contemplated that the practice ofjudging would occur according to common
law methods.
In calling attention to the understanding of the common law that
prevailed at the time of the Founding, I do not mean to minimize the
revolutionary importance of a written Constitution. As a committed
textualist, I well recognize the Framers' achievement in fixing our nation's fundamental law in written form. And I recall, of course, that
the Framers' desire to limit the reach of government through positive
law led the Marshall Court, in the famous case of United States v. Hudson & Goodwin,' 6 to forbid the development of a federal common law
of crimes. Nevertheless, the deeper significance of common law
thinking in the Constitution is inescapable. And so I suggest that
rediscovering the original understanding of the common law might
have important implications for constitutional interpretation today.
I have already noted that traditional common law principles informed the restrained judicial role envisioned by the Framers.
Judges' limited role in our system of government stems in large measure from the common law and its emphasis on custom, popular consent, reason, and natural law. In a broad sense, then, a contemporary
awareness of the original understanding of the common law might
14 Id. at 471.
15 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89
REV. 1 (1975).
16 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
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serve as a reminder that unprincipled judicial lawmaking is illegitimate. Common law adjudication should restrain judicial creativity
rather than encourage and endorse it.
More specifically, the original understanding of the common law
would reinvigorate considerations of tradition and custom in the judiciary. Regrettably, many recent judicial decisions give short shrift to
deeply-rooted traditions. In uncovering new constitutional rights,
some federal courts have dismissed claims that such newly-fashioned
rights do not comport with long-standing communal values. 17 For advocates of a living Constitution, talk of tradition and custom in constitutional interpretation masks historical injustices and majoritarian
oppression. Yet it is precisely these concerns that must have a prominent place in constitutional adjudication. As Justice Scalia has noted,
"[S]uch traditions are themselves the stuff out of which the [Supreme] Court's principles are to be formed." 18 Otherwise, constitutional law reflects not the democratic traditions of the sovereign
people, but the varying political and philosophical preferences of
judges.
To give one example, an en banc panel of my court, by contorting the doctrine of substantive due process, found a constitutional
right to physician-assisted suicide. 19 Although Compassion in Dying v.
Washington was later unanimously reversed by the U.S. Supreme
Court, 20 the Ninth Circuit's decision ignored restrained principles of

common law adjudication in two ways. First, as I emphasized in my
dissent from my court's refusal to rehear the case, the majority
"usurp[ed] the state legislative function, and in so doing silence[d]
the voice of the people of Washington,"' 21 who only five years before
had rejected an assisted suicide law. 22 This, of course, violated the

core common law principle of legislative supremacy-for contrary legislative will necessarily trumps the common law. Second, the majority
engaged in a stunning misreading of historical evidence that showed
no tradition of protecting an ostensible liberty interest in physicianassisted suicide. Indeed, the common and statutory law of nearly all
the western states that comprise the Ninth Circuit forbade assisted sui17 See, e.g.,
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (establishing a substantive
due process right to sexual autonomy).
18 Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 96 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
20 See id., rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
21 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1996)
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from order rejecting request for hearing en banc by the
full court).
22 Id. at 1440 n.1 (O'Scannlain,J., dissenting).
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cide. 23 In disregarding this evidence, the judges of the majority substituted their own well intentioned but expansive belief in personal
autonomy for deeply-rooted legal and communal traditions.
The true spirit of the common law, by contrast, accords appropriate deference to tradition and custom. At common law, a custom hallowed by continuous and peaceable use was understood to reflect a
communal consensus. The legal force such customs acquired under
the common law was not something to be easily dismissed. Indeed,
common law precedents were not to be overruled unless, in Blackstone's words, "most evidently contrary to reason... [or] clearly contrary to the divine law."' 24 This establishes a burden of justification for
those opposed to the extension of traditions. I hasten to add that
"contrary to reason" did not mean merely inexpedient under current
circumstances. Reason was not the creative thought process of an individual judge, but, as Professor Stoner deftly puts it, "[a] duty to keep
the law consistent with itself."25 Common law reasoning was a moral
activity that carefully and humbly considered new cases in light of tradition and natural law's respect for inherent human dignity. A common law judge was thus the custodian of the communal achievement,
forged across generations, of law.
In place of the common law's respect for communal values and
tradition of moral reasoning, our courts often substitute an incoherent theory of stare decisis. I am hardly the first to observe that our
judiciary's treatment of precedent often seems driven by concerns of
expediency. 26 I think it no accident, for example, that our jurisprudence has had a difficult time developing a consistent theory of stare
decisis. When stare decisis serves only to express policy concerns, we
are in the world of legal realism and not that of Blackstone. For those
engaged in the modern mode of common law judging, precedent is
only one more weapon in the lawmaking judge's arsenal. A treatment
of precedent that can briskly dismiss long-standing communal and familial values while elevating the importance of a court's institutional

23 Id. at 1445-46 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting); see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at
710-18.
24 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *69.
25 STONER, supra note 5, at 28.
26 See Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Remarks at the Federalist Society Lawyers' Convention Panel on Judicial Decisionmaking, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 17, 2001) (manuscript at 3-5, on file with author); see also Charles Fried, ConstitutionalDoctrine, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1143 (1994); Symposium, JudicialDecisionmaking: The Role of Text,
Precedent, and the Rule of Law, 17 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y xix (1994).
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understanding of
legitimacy is profoundly at odds with the Framers'
27
the restraining influence of the common law.

I have dwelled upon the original understanding of the common
law today not out of any nostalgic (and quixotic) desire to revive feudal land tenures or the law of coverture. But I do hope I have made
clear that common law adjudication as envisioned by the Framers was
meant to be something more than an exercise in legal creativity. In
carefully establishing structures that limited the judicial role, the
Framers also assumed that the common law tradition of principled
judging would persist.
Although not a living Constitution, of course, the Framers' grand
design-suffused throughout with the common law's heritage ofjudicial restraint and ordered liberty-nevertheless remains a living resource for us today. And just as common law judges were duty-bound
to interpret the law in the light of tradition and the dictates of reason,
so too must we fulfill our obligation to interpret the Constitution with
restraint.
Thank you for your attention today. I welcome your questions.

27 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-71 (1992)
(plurality opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) (discussing why stare
decisis counseled against overturning Roe v. Wade).
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